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Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States:
Jurisdiction over Patent Infringement Claims
Against the United States
In 1910, Congress waived the sovereign immunity of the United
States with regard to patent infringement claims by giving the Court of
Claims jurisdiction to hear such claims; that jurisdictional grant is now
28 U.S.C. § 1498. This statute provides that in a patent infringement
claim involving any production undertaken "by or for the United
States," the owner's exclusive remedy shall be against the United
States in the Court of Claims, and shall be limited to compensatory
money damages. This jurisdictional statute effectively amounts to an
eminent domain provision, 1 for it precludes the possibility of injunctive relief against the government contractors and government officials
involved in infringing the patent.
Since the end of World War II, as the furnishing of foreign aid has
become an important part of American foreign policy, it has been
thought particularly important to prevent injunctions which would
delay or halt production undertaken as a part of such aid. 2 To foreclose
the possibility of such injunctions - a possibility left open by uncertainty as to whether such production, destined for foreign countries,
was "for" the United States within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 14983 the foreign aid statute had included a special provision giving the
Court of Claims jurisdiction to hear such claims. 4 This provision was,5
however, omitted from the 1968 Foreign Military Sales Act [FMSA],
which generally reenacted the military sales provisions after taking
them out of the more general foreign aid statute, the 1961 Foreign
Assistance Act [FAA].
In Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 6 the Court of Claims was
called upon to decide whether, despite that omission, it would
continue to exercise jurisdiction over patent infringement cases regarding production for foreign military sales. The court held that jurisdiction attached by virtue of both 28 U.S.C. § 1498 and the special
jurisdictional provision of the 1961 FAA, section 606 of that act, 22
U.S.C. § 2356. By thus exercising jurisdiction, and thereby holding

ISee J. DAVIS, U.S.
2 See

COURT OF CLAIMS PATENT PRACTICE 24-25, 40-41 (3d ed. 1970).
CONF. REP. No. 1090, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1951] U.S. CODE CONG.

& AD. NEWS 2312, 2323.

3 Id.
4 22 U.S.C. § 2356 (1970) Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, § 606, Pub. L. No. 87-195,

75 Stat. 440; originally enacted as Mutual Security Act of 1951, § 517, ch. 479, 65 Stat.
382.
5 Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320 (codified at
22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-93 (1970)).
6 534 F.2d 889 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
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open a forum for such claims to be asserted against the United States,
the court continued to protect the government's foreign military sales
procurement program from the dangers of aggrieved patent holders
seeking injunctive relief against government contractors and government officials.
The Hughes Aircraft Company held the patents on an orbit
stabilization device which it alleged had been used in the Skynet II
defense communications satellite. The Skynet II satellite was the
British link in an advanced system of United States-United Kingdom
worldwide defense communications, which was provided for in a 1970
Memorandum of Understanding [MOU] between the two countries.
The satellite was to be launched by the United States, and to insure
technical compatability with the United States system, considerable
technical assistance was to be provided by the United States. All
assistance was to be paid for by the United Kingdom through periodic
reimbursement procedures established by the 1968 FMSA. Obtaining
patent rights from American patent holders was to be part of this
assistance; the Defense Department therefore, acting through the
British Government (which had let the contracts involved), gave to the
contractors the authorization and consent of the United States Government for the possible infringement of the Hughes patents. The
Defense Department's explicit intention in so acting was to bring these

patents within the "eminent domain provisions of 28 U.S.C. §
1498(a).

''7

The Department of Justice moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, and presented the court with four contentions
in support of its motion: (1) The patented invention was not "used or
manufactured by or for the United States" as required by 28 U.S.C. §
1498; (2) Jurisdiction was precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 1502, which
prohibits the court from adjudicating claims "growing out of or
dependent upon" a treaty; (3) Jurisdiction was precluded because all
United States expenditures in the Skynet project were reimbursed by
the British, making the project a non-appropriated fund activity over
which the court had no jurisdiction since its judgments must be paid
out of appropriated funds under 28 U.S.C. § 2517; (4) The omission of
the special provision for patent jurisdiction from the 1968 FMSA was
proof of a congressional intent to exclude such claims from the court's
jurisdiction.
The court's basic patent jurisdiction, derived from 28 U.S.C. §
1498, provides a remedy for any unauthorized use or manufacture "by
or for" the United States. Subsection (b) defines a use or manufacture
"for" the United States as any which is undertaken "for the Government and with its authorization and consent." The Justice Department
Id. at 900.
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in the Hughes case contended that the Skynet II project did not meet
this "by or for" test.
The court held, to the contrary, that the project met both alternatives of the test. The court found a use by the United States within the
meaning of the statute, in the considerable direct control which the
United States exerted over the project, a control which included the
actual launch itself. The Justice Department's argument that this use
was entirely on behalf of the United Kingdom was summarily rejected,
with the court relying on weighty declarations in the MOU as to the
mutually beneficial aims of the project. The court also quoted the 1968
FMSA to the effect that its procedures were established for national
security purposes.
These same arguments as to the project's benefits to the United
States were again relied on as the court also held that the Skynet
satellite was manufactured for the United States within the meaning of
section 1498. The reliance on the FMSA was of particular interest as
there had been some doubt whether such foreign assistance was "for"
the United States under section 1498 until the special jurisdictional
provision was enacted into an early predecessor of the FMSA. The
amply documented purpose of this provision was to proclaim that
materials obtained for foreign aid were "for" the United States within
the meaning and purpose of section 1498.8 The court inferred from this
that the FMSA procurement program was also "for" the United States.
Thus the jurisdictional clause omitted from the FMSA was relied on to
sustain jurisdiction under the more general grant.
Having initially found that the claim fell within the provisions of
section 1498, however, the court was faced with other challenges to its
exercise of jurisdiction. The otherwise valid jurisdiction in the Court of
Claims could be ousted if the claim is viewed as one "growing out of or
dependent on" a treaty. In addition, if the government activity
involved does not operate with appropriated funds, then it may not
obligate such funds. The court therefore may not exercise jurisdiction
over claims relating to that activity, for the court's judgments must be
paid out of appropriated funds. 9 The Department of Justice contended
that both of these jurisdictional preclusions applied to this claim; the
court rejected both contentions.
The contention that the claim grew out of a treaty (the MOU which
established the Skynet II project) was rejected easily because "The real
issue ... is not ... whether the Government's activities were dependent
upon the 1970 MOU . . ., but whether plaintiff's claim so depends." 10
(Emphasis in original.)
8 See text at notes 2 and 3 supra.
9See, e.g., Breitbeck v. United States, 500 F.2d 556, 558 (Ct. C1. 1974); Interdent v.
United States, 488 F.2d 1011, 1012-13 (Ct. C1. 1973).
10534 F.2d at 903.
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The non-appropriated fund preclusion presented a more difficult
problem. The Justice Department argued that since all United States
expenditures were to be reimbursed by the United Kingdom, the
project was essentially self-supporting as far as the United States was
concerned, and was therefore a non-appropriated fund activity. The
court rejected the argument, reasoning that United States appropriated
funds were to be used on a continuing basis, prior to periodic
reimbursement, so the program was dependent upon and could
obligate appropriated funds. Furthermore, the MOU establishing the
project contained a patent infringement claims indemnity clause,
indicating that the Government expected such claims to be paid out of
appropriated funds. Finally, appropriated funds had been used to pay
patent infringement claims under the predecessors to the 1968 FMSA,
all of which had had similar reimbursement provisions. This combination of factors, said the court, negated "any risk of violating the
fundamental policy underlying section 2517 by imposing an unauthorized burden on the public treasury."'"
The final argument put forward by the Justice Department was
that the omission of a specific patent jurisdiction provision from the
1968 FMSA showed a congressional intent to eliminate the court's
jurisdiction over such claims in foreign military sales cases. The court
found it "simply inconceivable," 12 in view of the important function
served by this jurisdiction (i.e., precluding disruptive injunctions), that
Congress would simply by omission, and without explanation or
debate, have intended to eliminate that jurisdiction. The court therefore held that when the foreign military sales provisions were taken
out of the general foreign aid statute (the 1961 FAA) and reenacted as
the 1968 FMSA, the special jurisdictional section of the 1961 FAA
remained applicable to those provisions.
In thus rejecting every one of the Justice Department's jurisdictional attacks, the Court of Claims determined to hold open a forum for
patent infringement claims against the Government arising out of the
Government's activities under the 1968 FMSA. However, one question
remains: does the court's jurisdiction in this area rest on its bdsic grant
of patent jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1498, or is it indeed based on
22 U.S.C. § 2356, the special jurisdictional provision of the 1961 FAA
which the court held applicable to the 1968 FMSA? The question is not
likely to become crucial in the Court of Claims, since its remedial
powers are the same in either case. Nevertheless, the question is not an
idle one, for under 28 U.S.C. § 1498, the court has exclusive jurisdiction, whereas under 22 U.S.C. § 2356 it shares concurrent jurisdiction
with the federal district courts. Thus the court's tour deforce in rejecting
every one of the Justice Department's arguments leaves an ambiguity
11Id. at 912.
12

Id. at 914.
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which must be considered by prospective plaintiffs deciding where to
13
bring their actions.
This ambiguity pervades the court's opinion. Jurisdiction was
asserted initially under the more general provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1498,
yet the specific provision in 22 U.S.C. § 2356 was cited to show that the
project was "for" the United States under section 1498. The court
reached the question of the non-appropriated fund preclusion's
applicability to the FMSA only because jurisdiction was asserted under
the more general clause, but the earlier foreign aid acts with the
specific clause were cited as evidence that appropriated funds were
available to pay the claim. Furthermore, the final holding that the
specific clause was applicable to the 1968 FMSA would have been
sufficient by itself to uphold jurisdiction, yet the court did not rely
exclusively on that holding.
This close relationship between the two jurisdictional grants can
be seen as an argument that the court reached the correct result. As the
Defense Department argued in an affadavit supporting plaintiff's
assertion of jurisdiction, a coherent foreign aid program must provide
a forum for aggrieved patent holders to assert claims against the
government, thereby protecting government contractors and preventing disruptive injunctions. These jurisdictional provisions were
enacted to serve precisely that function. It is natural that they should
complement each other in refuting the jurisdictional attacks in this
case.
Individually, the arguments put forward by the Justice Department were weak. Their collective weight was fairly formidable. Had
the Justice Department's arguments prevailed, they would have done
so over the needs of the Defense Department. By resisting these
jurisdictional attacks, the Court of Claims avoided the promulgation of
an incoherent policy.
MICHAEL

L.

BALL

13 For discussions of considerations relevant to this decision, see J. DAVIS, supra
note 2, at 28-29; Pasley and TeSelle, Patent Rights and Technical Information in the
Military Assistance Program, 29 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 566, 576 (1964).

